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Obtaining grant funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
is increasingly competitive, as funding success rates have declined
over the past decade. To allocate relatively scarce funds, scientific
peer reviewers must differentiate the very best applications from
comparatively weaker ones. Despite the importance of this determi-
nation, little research has explored how reviewers assign ratings to
the applications they review and whether there is consistency in the
reviewers’ evaluation of the same application. Replicating all as-
pects of the NIH peer-review process, we examined 43 individual
reviewers’ ratings and written critiques of the same group of 25 NIH
grant applications. Results showed no agreement among reviewers
regarding the quality of the applications in either their qualitative or
quantitative evaluations. Although all reviewers received the same
instructions on how to rate applications and format their written
critiques, we also found no agreement in how reviewers “translated”
a given number of strengths and weaknesses into a numeric rating. It
appeared that the outcome of the grant review depended more on
the reviewer to whom the grant was assigned than the research pro-
posed in the grant. This research replicates the NIH peer-review pro-
cess to examine in detail the qualitative and quantitative judgments
of different reviewers examining the same application, and our results
have broad relevance for scientific grant peer review.
peer review | social sciences | interrater reliability |
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In the past decade, funding at the National Institutes of Health(NIH) has increased at a much slower rate (1) than the number
of grant applications (2), and consequently, success rates have
steadily declined (3). There are more deserving grant applications
than there are available funds, so it is critical to ensure that the
process responsible for awarding such funds—grant peer review—
reliably differentiates the very best applications from the compara-
tively weaker ones. Research on grant peer review is inconclusive:
Some studies suggest that it is unreliable (4–13) and potentially bi-
ased (14–17), whereas others show the validity of review systems and
final outcomes (18–20). However, even if peer review effectively
discriminates the good applications from the bad, it is now imper-
ative to empirically assess whether, in this culture of decreasing
funding rates, it can discriminate the good from the excellent within
a pool of high-quality applications. As Chubin and Hackett (21)
argue, intensified competition for resources harms peer review be-
cause funding decisions rely on an evaluation process that is not
designed to distinguish among applications of similar quality—a
scenario that they argue is most prevalent at the NIH. Indeed, the
findings in the present paper suggest that, in fact, reviewers are
unable to differentiate excellent applications (i.e., those funded by
the NIH in the first round) from good applications (i.e., those un-
funded but later funded by the NIH after subsequent revisions).
Because the grant peer-review process at NIH is confidential, the
only way to systematically examine it is to replicate the process
outside of the NIH in a highly realistic manner. This is precisely
what we did in the research reported in this paper. We recruited
43 oncology researchers from across the United States to participate
in one of four peer-review panels (called “study sections” at NIH),
each composed of 8–12 reviewers. Fig. 1 presents a deidentified
image from one study section meeting. We solicited 25 oncology
grant applications submitted to NIH as R01s—the most competitive
and highly sought after type of grant at NIH—between 1 and 4 y
before our study. Sixteen of these were funded in the first round
(i.e., the best applications), whereas 9 of these were funded only
after subsequent resubmission (i.e., the good applications).
The NIH uses a two-stage review process. In the first stage,
two to five reviewers individually evaluate each grant application
by assigning a preliminary rating using the NIH’s reverse 9-point
scale (1 = exceptional, 9 = poor) and writing a critique describing
the application’s strengths and weaknesses. Most typically, three
reviewers are assigned to an application: a primary, a secondary,
and a tertiary reviewer, ranked in order of the relevance of their
expertise. Reviewers then convene in study section meetings,
where they discuss the applications that received preliminary
ratings in the top half of all applications evaluated. After sharing
their preliminary ratings and critiques, the two to five assigned
reviewers discuss the application with all other study section
members, all of whom assign a final rating to the application.
This final rating from all members is averaged into a final “pri-
ority score.” In the second stage, members of NIH’s advisory
councils use this priority score and the written critiques to make
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funding recommendations to the director of the NIH institute or
center that awards the funding. Reviewers in study sections are
prohibited from discussing or considering issues related to
funding and instead are encouraged to rate each application
based on its scientific merit alone.
In our study, each reviewer served as the primary reviewer for two
deidentified applications. We analyzed only the ratings and critiques
from the primary reviewers because their critiques were longer and
more detailed than those of the secondary or tertiary reviewers. In
total, we obtained 83 ratings and critiques from 43 primary reviewers
evaluating 25 grant applications: Each reviewer evaluated two ap-
plications, except for three reviewers who evaluated one application,
so that every application was evaluated by between two and four
reviewers. Our methodology is presented in detail in SI Appendix.
We measured agreement among reviewers in terms of the pre-
liminary ratings that they assigned to grant applications before the
study section meeting. Our prior research (11) established that
discussion during study section meetings worsened rather than im-
proved disagreement among different study sections. The current
study aims to examine agreement in the individual ratings before the
study section meeting, with a focus on examining the alignment
between reviewers’ preliminary ratings and their written critiques.
Building off of the approach used by Fiske and Fogg (22) to
code the weaknesses in journal manuscript reviews, we coded the
critiques, assigning scores for the number of strengths and the
number of weaknesses noted by the reviewer. We measured
agreement among reviewers in terms of the number of strengths
and weaknesses that they noted. We also examined whether
different reviewers agreed on how a given number of strengths
and weaknesses should translate into a numeric rating.
Results showed that different reviewers assigned different
preliminary ratings and listed different numbers of strengths and
weaknesses for the same applications. We assessed agreement by
computing three different indicators for each outcome variable,
and we depict these measures of agreement in Fig. 2.
First, we estimated the intraclass correlation (ICC) for grant
applications. The ICC is a statistic that measures how strongly
units within a group resemble one another; for our study, the
ICC shows the extent to which different reviewers agreed in their
evaluations of a single grant application. The ICC turned out to
be 0 [P = 1.0, 95% CI (0, 0.14)]* for the ratings, 0 [P = 1.0, 95%
CI (0, 0.15)] for strengths, and 0.017 [P = 0.9, 95% CI (0, 0.18)]
for weaknesses, indicating that there was no agreement among
reviewers for a given application. Values of 0 for the ICC arise
when the variability in the ratings for different applications is smaller
than the variability in the ratings for the same application, which was
the case in our data. These results show that multiple ratings for the
same application were just as similar as ratings for different appli-
cations. Thus, although each of the 25 applications was on average
evaluated by more than three reviewers, our data had the same
structure as if we had used 83 different grant applications.
As another means of assessing agreement, we computed the
interrater reliability statistic Krippendorff’s alpha (23), which is
also an indicator of agreement and can be interpreted similarly
to Cronbach’s alpha (24): Values above 0.7 are generally con-
sidered acceptable. The Krippendorff’s alpha values were all
near zero, showing that there was no agreement among reviewers
in their ratings [α = 0.024, 95% CI (−0.047, 0.093)] or in the
number of strengths [α = −0.011, 95% CI (−0.094, 0.079)] or
weaknesses that they listed [α = 0.004, 95% CI (−0.063, 0.072)].
As a third means of assessing agreement, we computed an
overall similarity score for each of the 25 applications (see
Methods for computational details). Values larger than 0 on this
similarity measure indicate that multiple ratings for a single
application were on average more similar to each other than they
were to ratings of other applications. We computed a one-
sample t test to examine whether similarity scores for our
25 applications were on average reliably different from zero.
Results showed nonsignificant results for preliminary ratings
[t(24) = 0.07, P = 0.95, M = 0.01,† 95% CI (−0.21, 0.22)], for
strengths [t(24) = −0.35, P = 0.73, M = 0.01, 95% CI (−0.23,
0.25)], and for weaknesses [t(24) = 0.29, P = 0.77,M = 0.01, 95%
CI (−0.21, 0.22)]. In other words, two randomly selected ratings
for the same application were on average just as similar to each
other as two randomly selected ratings for different applications.
In an additional analysis (see SI Appendix for details), we ex-
amined whether our reviewers agreed with the original NIH
reviewers who decided on each application’s outcome when it
was first submitted to the NIH. The estimated linear mixed-
effects model (LMEM; SI Appendix, Table S6) showed that
our reviewers rated unfunded applications just as positively as
funded applications (P = 0.58). Funded and unfunded applica-
tions also did not differ in the number of strengths or weaknesses
that our reviewers mentioned in their critiques (Ps > 0.25).
Our analyses consistently show low levels of agreement among
reviewers in their evaluations of the same grant applications—not
only in terms of the preliminary rating that they assign, but also
in terms of the number of strengths and weaknesses that they
identify. Additionally, our results cannot be explained by differ-
ences in reviewers’ verbosity: When we repeated all agreement
analyses but considered only the major strengths and major
weaknesses that were identified in the written critiques, we found
similarly low levels of agreement (see SI Appendix for computa-
tional details). Note, however, that our sample included only high-
quality grant applications. The agreement may have been higher if
we had included grant applications that were more variable in
quality. Thus, our results show that reviewers do not reliably dif-
ferentiate between good and excellent grant applications. Specific
examples of reviewer comments that illustrate the qualitative
nature of the disagreement can be found in SI Appendix.
We wanted to know whether the lack of agreement stemmed
from reviewers’ differing opinions about what constitutes the best
science or whether they used the rating scale differently. In other
words, we assessed whether reviewers’ evaluations of an application
were simply different or whether they disagreed about how a given
number of strengths and weaknesses should be translated into a
Fig. 1. Deidentified image from one of four peer-review panel meetings.
*Note that because the ICC cannot take values smaller than 0, the lower bound of the
95% CI is 0 for all of the estimates. Confidence intervals were estimated via bootstrap-
ping using the confint function in lme4 within R. See SI Appendix for additional clarifi-
cation about interpreting values of the ICC.
†M is the point estimate for the mean difference derived by subtracting (i ) the average
absolute difference among all ratings for one application from (ii) the average absolute
difference between each rating for that application and the ratings for all other appli-
cations (see Methods for computational details). The 95% CI is the interval around M.
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numeric rating. To accomplish this goal, we examined whether
there is a relationship between the numeric ratings and critiques at
three different levels: for individual reviewers examining individual
applications, for a single reviewer examining multiple applications,
and for multiple reviewers examining a single application.
In an initial analysis (model 1, Table 1), we found no re-
lationship between the number of strengths listed in the written
critique and the numeric ratings. This finding suggests that a
positive rating (i.e., a low number) did not necessarily indicate a
large number of strengths in the critique, but instead reflected an
absence of weaknesses. For this reason, we focused only on the
relationship between the number of weaknesses and the pre-
liminary ratings in the analyses reported below. For each of the
25 applications, we computed the average number of weaknesses
that reviewers identified for that application (the “application
cluster means”). For each of the 43 reviewers, we also computed
the average number of weaknesses written by that reviewer (the
“reviewer cluster means”). We then estimated a LMEM (model 2,
Table 1) in which we predicted the preliminary ratings as a
function of three fixed-effect variables: the number of weaknesses
listed by each reviewer for each of the applications, the applica-
tion cluster means, and the reviewer cluster means.
As Table 1 shows, the first of these predictors in model 2 was
statistically significant: bWeaknesses(Within-Within) = 0.13; P = 0.003.
This result replicates the result from model 1 showing a signifi-
cant relationship between preliminary ratings and the number of
weaknesses within applications and within reviewers (i.e., for a
single reviewer evaluating a single application).
The second predictor, the application cluster means, was also
statistically significant, bWeaknesses(App_Cluster_Means) = 0.17; P <
0.001. This coefficient represents the weakness-rating relationship
between applications and within reviewers (i.e., for a single re-
viewer evaluating multiple applications). This result shows that,
when a given reviewer identified more weaknesses for application
A than for application B, then the reviewer also tended to give a
worse rating to application A than to application B. Conceptually,
this finding means that reviewers have internal standards that they
apply consistently when rating different applications.
Most importantly for the present paper, the third predictor was not
statistically significant: bWeaknesses(Rev_Cluster_Means) = 0.03; P = 0.19.
This coefficient represents the weakness-rating relationship between
reviewers and within applications (i.e., across multiple reviewers
evaluating a single application): When reviewer A identified more
weaknesses for a given application than reviewer B, it was not
necessarily the case that reviewer A evaluated that application
more negatively than reviewer B. Although null effects should be
interpreted with caution, a nonsignificant result here suggests that
reviewers do not agree on how a given number of weaknesses should
be translated into (or should be related to) a numeric rating.
The importance of this last finding cannot be overstated. If there
is a lack of consistency between different reviewers who evaluate the
same application, then it is impossible to compare the evaluations of
different reviewers who evaluate different applications. However,
this is the situation in which members of NIH study sections typically
find themselves, as their task is to rate different grant applications
that were evaluated by different reviewers. Our analyses suggest that
for high-quality applications (i.e., the good or best applications that
get discussed), this ranking process has a large random component,
since reviewers disagree about how the number of weaknesses and
the numeric rating are related to each other (even though they are
individually consistent in assigning worse ratings to applications for
which they have identified more weaknesses). The criteria consid-
ered when assigning a preliminary rating appear to have a large
subjective element, which is particularly problematic given that
biases against outgroup members (e.g., females and underrep-
resented racial/ethnic minorities) infiltrate decision-making pro-
cesses when evaluative criteria are subjective (25).
The findings reported in this paper suggest two fruitful avenues
for future research. First, important insight can be gained from
studies examining whether it is possible to get reviewers to apply the
same standards when translating a given number of weaknesses into
a preliminary rating. Reviewers could complete a short online
training (26) or receive instructions that explicitly define how the
quantity and magnitude of weaknesses aligns with a particular
rating, so that reviewers avoid redefining merit by inconsistently
weighting certain criteria (27). Second, future studies should ex-
amine whether it is possible for reviewers to find common ground
on what good science is before they complete their initial evalua-
tion. Prior research examining journal peer review suggests that
reviewers identify different, yet “appropriate and accurate” topics in
their critiques (ref. 28, p. 591). So, is the problem in grant peer
review that reviewers have fundamentally different goals? For ex-
ample, some choose to focus on weaknesses of the approach,
whereas others try to champion research that they believe should be
funded (22). Do these goals differ as a function of the reviewer’s
expertise related to a particular grant application (29)? Or, does the
lack of agreement stem from ambiguous, vague evaluative criteria
that introduce subjectivity into the way such criteria are applied (25,
Table 1. Parameter estimates from models 1 and 2
Parameters Model 1 Model 2
Fixed effects b(SE)Sig b(SE)Sig
(Intercept) 3.46 (0.21)*** 3.51 (0.15)***
Strengths(Within-Within) −0.01 (0.02) –
Weaknesses(Within-Within) 0.08 (0.03)* 0.13 (0.02)**
Weaknesses(App_Cluster_Means) – 0.17 (0.03)***
Weaknesses(Rev_Cluster_Means) – 0.03 (0.02)
Random effects
By reviewer
Intercept 0.97 0.62
Strengths(Within-Within) 0.00 –
Weaknesses(Within-Within) 0.00 0.00
By application
Intercept 0.16 0.00
Strengths(Within-Within) 0.00 –
Weaknesses(Within-Within) 0.01 0.00
Residual 0.45 0.69
On the outcome variable (preliminary rating), higher values represent
more negative evaluations. The values reported for the random effects are
variances. Dashes indicate the predictor was not included in the model. *P <
0.05. **P < 0.01. ***P < 0.001.
Fig. 2. Visual depiction of the three measures of agreement among re-
viewers with 95% CIs. Note that only the upper bound of the CI is shown for
the ICCs because the lower bound is by definition 0.
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27)? Future studies ought to empirically examine whether address-
ing these issues might help improve agreement among reviewers.
If additional research were to reveal that it is impossible to
increase agreement, then a viable solution would be to implement
a modified lottery system, in which applications are initially
screened by reviewers, and then a given proportion of applications
with the best ratings are entered into a lottery (10). Compared
with the costly peer-review process that is currently in place, such
a lottery would free up financial resources that could be used to
fund a larger number of grants. In addition, it would also allow the
NIH to assess whether applications with very high ratings from the
initial screening really yield more influential results and impactful
publications than applications with slightly lower ratings from the
initial screening. However, before moving forward with a modified
lottery, additional studies with a larger sample of applications
covering a wider variety of research areas ought to be conducted,
perhaps by the NIH, to replicate the findings of our study.
Our study is not without limitations. First, we examined only
evaluations of grant applications that were initially funded or
eventually funded after subsequent revision; thus, we cannot say
whether these findings would generalize to an entire pool of ap-
plications, including those that might never be funded by the NIH.
Nonetheless, the results do show that, for grants above a certain
quality threshold, the peer-review process is completely random.
In addition, evaluating the reliability of grant peer review among
strong applications that are considered fundable (i.e., those ap-
plications that are discussed during study section meetings) re-
flects the reality of the current funding climate today, where
eligible applications continue to outweigh available funds. Nev-
ertheless, future research should aim to extend the findings in this
paper to a pool of applications of more diverse quality.
A second potential limitation stems from the possibility that
reviewers in our study may have put less time and effort into
their evaluations than real reviewers do when they know there
are millions of dollars of research funds at stake. Relatedly,
perhaps reviewers were more lenient in their judgments or less
committed to their ratings because they knew their decisions
would not result in real funding outcomes. However, we have
evidence suggesting that the effort our reviewers put in for our
study is comparable to the effort they would apply to an actual
NIH study section. In a survey administered to reviewers, 81% of
them reported that the premeeting process was either very
similar or identical to actual NIH study sections in which they
had participated. In addition, SI Appendix includes transcripts
from interviews with our reviewers, statements from the Scien-
tific Review Officer (SRO) in our study, and analyses of the word
counts of reviewers’ critiques compared with a national sample
of more than 18,000 real NIH summary statements, all of which
serve to corroborate the claim that reviewers took the task as
seriously as if they had been part of a real study section.
One final limitation is that our study has a relatively small
sample size, which means that our statistical models are somewhat
underpowered. However, our most crucial effects are all estimated
to be zero, suggesting that lack of power is not the issue. Fur-
thermore, even if one is willing to accept a much higher type I
error rate (e.g., α = 0.15), these effects would still be non-
significant. Nevertheless, a larger-scale study replicating our
methods and analyses, and exploring their generalizability to
other kinds of grant applications, is a fruitful and exciting arena
for future research.
The process of vetting the quality, feasibility, and significance
of multimillion dollar research projects is crucial to ensuring that
increasingly sparse research funds are spent on the most meri-
torious applications. In these times of funding austerity, it is as
important as ever to subject the current system of NIH peer
review to continued empirical scrutiny to assess its efficacy and to
evaluate possible interventions to improve the process. Determining
additional or alternative practices to maximize reliability while
minimizing the burdensome costs of grant peer review is vital for
ensuring scientific progress.
Methods
The present study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, and informed consent was obtained from
all participants (i.e., the reviewers in our study). The peer-review process at
NIH is confidential, and all materials used during the peer-review process are
destroyed at the end of every study section meeting (30). Thus, the only way
to systematically examine the grant peer-review process is to replicate it outside
of the NIH in a highly realistic manner. We designed and implemented four
“constructed” study section meetings that emulated the NIH peer-review pro-
cess in every respect possible. Throughout the study design and data collection,
our team worked closely with a highly experienced SRO, Jean Sipe, who retired
in 2012 after serving as an SRO for the NIH since 1997. Sipe had been the
chairperson of the SRO handbook committee and the review policy coordinator
since 2003, so she had extensive experience related to conducting and moni-
toring study sections at the NIH. Sipe guided all of our methodological decisions
to ensure that they emulated NIH peer-review practices in every respect possi-
ble, and she served as the SRO for all of our constructed study sections.
To assess how closely our constructed study sections emulated real study
sections, we administered a survey to our reviewers after the completion of
each meeting asking them to rate their experiences on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = completely different, 7 = identical). Eighty-eight percent of the re-
viewers responded, and of those, 81% reported that the premeeting process
was either very similar (6) or identical (7) to actual NIH study sections in
which they had participated, and 78% reported that the meetings them-
selves were very similar or identical to actual NIH study section meetings.
Participants. We recruited 43 reviewers to participate in the study. Sipe used
NIH’s public database, RePORTER, to identify all investigators who had re-
ceived an R01 award from the National Cancer Institute between 1 and 4
years prior to our study. Potential reviewers were emailed and invited to
serve as a reviewer for an ad hoc study section to evaluate real but
deidentified R01 grant applications. They were offered a $500 honorarium
for their participation, with all travel and expenses reimbursed. Among in-
terested respondents, Sipe selected the reviewers in the same way she would
for a regular NIH study section. SI Appendix, Table S1, provides demographic
information about our reviewers.
Materials. Our research team utilized RePORTER to identify principal inves-
tigators (PIs) who had submitted an R01 application between 1 and 4 years
prior to our study to one of two oncology study sections within the NIH’s
National Cancer Institute: either the Oncology 1 Basic Translational Integrated
Review Group or the Oncology 2 Translational Clinical Integrated Review
Group. We invited these PIs to donate their funded and any unfunded ver-
sions of subsequently funded applications to our study. In consultation with
Sipe, our research team selected 25 applications, 16 of which (64%) were
initially funded and 9 of which (36%) were funded only after later resub-
mission. For these latter nine applications, we utilized the initial unfunded
application to ensure variability in the quality of the grants in our study.
All applications were deidentified, meaning the names of the PIs, any
coinvestigators, and any other research personnel were replaced with
pseudonyms. We selected pseudonyms using public databases of names that
preserved the original gender, nationality, and relative frequency across
national populations of the original names. All identifying information, in-
cluding institutional addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and hand-
written signatures were similarly anonymized and re-identified as well.
Procedure. In consultation with Sipe and staff from the NIH’s Center for Sci-
entific Review, our research team asked each reviewer to evaluate six appli-
cations: two as primary reviewer, two as secondary reviewer, and two as
tertiary reviewer. This is on the low end of what would be typical in an NIH
study section, which was intended to ensure maximal participation in our
study. As is the norm for real NIH study sections, Sipe used reviewers’ NIH
biosketches and curricula vitae to assign applications to reviewers based on
their expertise. Based on these assignments, Sipe appointed the reviewers to
participate in one of the four study section meetings to ensure that each
application was evaluated by three reviewers (one primary, one secondary,
and one tertiary) in each study section. Each study section consisted of
8–12 reviewers. Most applications were evaluated by all four study sections,
whereas a small subset of applications were evaluated by fewer than four
panels. The assignment to applications and to study sections was not entirely
random due to the highly specialized nature of the applications under review.
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As is typical for NIH study sections, reviewers read the applications assigned to
them before the meeting. They prepared a written critique that detailed the
perceived strengths and weaknesses in terms of the overall impact and five
specific criteria: significance, innovation, investigators, approach, and environ-
ment. Reviewers also assigned numeric ratings using a reverse 9-point scale (1 =
exceptional, 9 = poor) for the overall impact and for each of the five criteria.
The analyses reported in this paper include the critiques and ratings from pri-
mary but not from secondary or tertiary reviewers because the primary re-
viewers are those with the expertise most closely aligned to the application and
because the reviewers in our study tended to put more detail and effort into
their primary critiques compared with their secondary or tertiary critiques.
The applications were made available to the reviewers 5 wk before their
meeting date via an online portal hosted by the institution at which the
research took place. In the online portal, reviewers uploaded their written
critiques using the same template used by NIH, and they entered their nu-
meric ratings for each application. All reviewers in a given study section
meeting were provided access to all of the reviews from other reviewers
within their study section 2 d before themeeting, which is in linewith real NIH
study sections. As is also typical for NIH study sections, our SRO, Jean Sipe,
monitored the review submissions and managed communication with re-
viewers to ensure that their submissions were complete and on time.
Qualitative Analysis. In total, we obtained 83written critiques and preliminary
ratings from the 43 reviewers, since three reviewers evaluated only one
application as primary reviewer due to their particular expertise. We devised
a coding scheme to analyze the number and types of strengths and weak-
nesses that primary reviewers pointed out in their critiques of applications.
Each critique was coded and assigned two scores: (i) the number of strengths
mentioned in the critique and (ii) the number of weaknesses. SI Appendix
provides additional details about our coding approach.
Quantitative Analysis.
Agreement among reviewers. We assessed agreement for each of the three key
variables: preliminary ratings, number of strengths, and number of weak-
nesses. We examined agreement with three different approaches, each
described in turn below. For complete transparency, and because we wanted
to treat both random factors (reviewers and applications) equally, we also
examined agreement among applications (i.e., whether the ratings and
evaluations across applications were consistent for a single reviewer; see SI
Appendix), but readers should be aware that the primary focus of this paper
is on the indicators for agreement among reviewers (i.e., whether the rat-
ings and evaluations across reviewers were consistent for a single applica-
tion). In addition, we repeated the analyses below using only the major
strengths and major weaknesses that reviewers identified (rather than all
strengths and all weaknesses) to ensure that the results were not con-
founded with reviewers’ verbosity, and found similar results (SI Appendix).
First, we estimated the ICC, which measures the degree to which obser-
vations are clustered by a given random factor (here, application); in other
words, the ICC measures the proportion of the total variance in the outcome
variable (e.g., rating) that is attributable to the application itself. To compute
the ICC, we estimated one model for each of the key variables (ratings,
strengths, weaknesses). Each model included an overall fixed intercept and a
random intercept for application. We then computed the ICC by dividing the
variance of the random intercept by the total variance (i.e., the sum of the
variance of the intercept and the variance of the residuals). SI Appendix, Table
S5, provides the ICC values for ratings, strengths, and weaknesses for grant
applications (i.e., examining agreement among reviewers within a grant ap-
plication). SI Appendix also describes alternative specifications of the ICC.
Second, to corroborate the findings from estimating the ICC, we computed
agreement among reviewers for each variable using the Krippendorff’s alpha
statistic (23). Krippendorff’s alpha is an interrater reliability statistic that accom-
modates any kind of data (e.g., nominal, ordinal, interval), allows for missing
values, and can be applied to any number of individual raters. It can be inter-
preted similarly to Cronbach’s alpha: Values above 0.7 are generally considered
acceptable (31). This set of analyses was carried out on a data file in which re-
viewers were treated like raters (columns) and applications were treated like
targets (rows). We used 1,000 bootstrapped samples to estimate a 95% CI for
each estimate. SI Appendix, Table S5, displays the values for Krippendorff’s alpha.
Third, as an additionalmeans of corroborating the findings from the ICC,we
compared the similarity of ratings referring to one application versus the
similarity of ratings referring to different applications. We computed two
scores for every application: The first scorewas the average absolute difference
between all ratings referring to that application. The second score was the
average absolute difference between each of the ratings referring to that
application and each of the ratings referring to all other applications. In the
next step, we subtracted the first score from the second score to compute an
overall similarity score per application. Values above zero on this score
indicate that an application’s ratings are more similar to each other than to
ratings referring to other applications. We then tested whether the
25 overall similarity scores were significantly different from zero. Finally,
we repeated this procedure for strengths and weaknesses mentioned in
the reviewers’ critiques. SI Appendix, Table S5, provides the estimates for
these similarity tests.
Relationship between ratings and critiques. We next asked whether there is a
relationship between the numeric evaluations and the verbal evaluations. No
relationship would suggest that individual reviewers struggle to reliably assign
similar numeric ratings to applications that they evaluate as having similar
numbers of strengths and weaknesses. By comparison, evidence of a re-
lationship would suggest that the lack of agreement among reviewers stems
from their having fundamentally different opinions about the quality of the
application—and not simply that they used the rating scale differently.
We began by estimating a model using the lme4 package (32) in R in which
we predicted an observation’s preliminary rating from the number of strengths
and the number of weaknesses (model 1, Table 1). Note that the data contain
two random factors—reviewers and applications—that are crossed with each
other. The two predictors, strengths and weaknesses, are continuous and vary
both within reviewers and within applications. In such a case, it is necessary to
“adaptively center” the predictors (33). This approach is similar to what others
have referred to as “doubly centering” predictors (34). Failure to do so would lead
to regression coefficients that are an “uninterpretable blend” of within-cluster and
between-cluster effects (ref. 33, p. 138). Adaptive centering involves subtracting
each of the two cluster means from the raw score and then adding the grand
mean. For example, we adaptively centered the strength variable by taking the
raw score and then (i) subtracting the mean number of strengths for a given re-
viewer (across applications), (ii) subtracting the mean number of strengths for a
given application (across reviewers), and (iii) adding in the grandmean of strengths
(the average of all 83 strength values). We adaptively centered both the strength
and the weakness scores.
To account for nonindependence in the data, we included the appropriate
random effects. We followed the lead of Brauer and Curtin (35) and included,
for each of the random factors, one random intercept and one random slope
per predictor. In total, we included six random effects—a by-reviewer ran-
dom intercept, a by-reviewer random slope for strengths, a by-reviewer
random slope for weaknesses, a by-application random intercept, a by-
application random slope for strengths, and a by-application random slope
for weaknesses—plus all possible covariances.
The resulting model was a LMEM with three fixed effects (the intercept
and the two predictors) and 12 random effects. The full model did not
converge, so we removed all covariances among random effects and rees-
timated the model, which achieved convergence. The parameter estimates
from this model are presented in Table 1.
In model 1, the regression coefficients describe the (partial) relationships
between each of the predictors and the outcome variable that are un-
confounded with any between-cluster effects. In other words, they describe the
within-reviewer/within-application relationships. Note that, when data are
clustered by one random factor (e.g., applications nested within reviewers), it is
possible to examine the relationship between outcome and predictor variables
at two levels: within and between clusters (e.g., within reviewers and between
reviewers). In our study, however, the data are clustered by two crossed ran-
dom factors (i.e., reviewers and applications). In such a case, a given relationship
can be examined at three levels: within-within, within-between, and between-
within. This is precisely what we did in the following analysis (model 2, Table 1).
We decided to focus on weaknesses only, because this predictor was the only
one that was significantly related to the outcome variable in model 1.
We adopted a data-analytic strategy by Enders and Tofighi (36) who proposed
to include the cluster-mean centered predictor (to examine the within-cluster
relationship) and the mean-centered predictor cluster means (to examine the
between-cluster relationship). We estimated a LMEMwith the preliminary rating
as the outcome variable that included the following predictors: the adaptively
centered weakness value (to examine the within-reviewer/within-application
relationship), the mean-centered reviewer cluster means of the weakness val-
ues (to examine the between-reviewer/within-application relationship), and the
mean-centered application cluster means of the weakness values (to examine
the between-application/within-reviewer relationship). We also included a ran-
dom intercept and a random slope for the adaptively centered predictor for each
of the two random factors (reviewers and applications). The full model with all
possible covariances did not converge, but the model without the covariances
did. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1, model 2.
SI Appendix includes additional supplementary analyses, including (i)
measuring agreement among reviewers for funded versus initially unfunded
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applications, (ii) replicating analyses with major strengths and major weak-
nesses only, (iii) measuring agreement among applications, (iv) exploring the
statistical relationship between strengths and weaknesses, (v) using alterna-
tive model specifications [e.g., the “model selection approach” of Bates and
colleagues (37)], (vi) computing alternative measures of the ICC, and (vii) re-
estimating all models with the inclusion of a single outlier in our data.
Data Sharing Plan. Deidentified data can be provided by request from the
corresponding author. All code used in statistical analyses is included at the
end of SI Appendix.
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